












which	 represents	a	human	eye,	 is	 also	horizontally	 stretched	 (Baltrusaitis	 [1977]:	33;	




while	 constructing	 an	 image	 and	 later	 in	 viewing	 the	 final	 result.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Leonardo,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 his	 drawings	were	not	made	 from	 that	 frontal	 position	
but	from	a	surprising	view	from	the	side,	at	the	extreme	edge	of	the	page.	As	a	result,	
when	the	drawings	are	viewed	head-on,	they	appear	distorted.	However,	when	viewed	
from	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 page	 –	 from	 the	 position	 from	 which	 they	 originated	 –	 they	
appear	to	be	perfectly	normal.	





Anamorphic	 distortion,	 as	 is	 equally	 true	 of	 perspective,	 functions	 by	 way	 of	
adjustments	 between	 size	 and	 distance.	 As	 the	 size	 of	 an	 object	 decreases,	 its	





increases,	 it	 appears	 to	be	nearer	 the	 viewer.	By	alternating	 trade-offs	between	 size	
and	 distance,	 we	 can	 create	 visual	 phenomena	 that	 appear	 to	 be	 nearer	 or	 farther	
away	and/or	appear	to	be	smaller	or	larger	in	size,	to	a	degree	that	is	often	surprising.	
Among	 the	best-known	examples	 of	 anamorphosis	 is	 a	 painting	by	Hans	Holbein,	
completed	in	1533,	a	couple	of	decades	later	than	Leonardo’s	original	note.	A	double	
portrait	titled	The	Ambassadors,	 it	depicts	in	astonishing	detail	two	French	emissaries	
to	the	court	of	King	Henry	VIII	of	England	(Fig.	1a).	 In	subject,	 it	 is	assuredly	complex	
enough	that	entire	books	have	been	written	about	its	labyrinthine	symbols.	But	for	our	
purposes,	 of	 primary	 interest	 is	 a	
seemingly	 indecipherable	 shape	 that	
hovers	 above	 the	 carpeted	 floor	 at	
the	 bottom	 center	 of	 the	 painting	
(Baltrusaitis	 [1977]:	 91-114;	 North	
[2004]). 	
That	mysterious	 floating	 form	 has	
been	 reproduced	 and	 written	 about	
so	 often	 that	 it	 would	 not	 be	
surprising	 to	 find	 that	 most	 readers	
already	 realize	 that	 it	 represents	 a	
human	 skull.	 To	 the	 uninitiated,	 if	
that	 is	 at	 first	 not	 apparent,	 it	 is	
because	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 painting	was	
designed	to	be	viewed	from	a	frontal	
observation	 point.	 In	 contrast,	 the	
skull	 is	 an	 anamorphic	distortion	 and	
was	 designed	 to	 be	 seen	 (just	 as	 in	
Leonardo’s	 examples)	 from	 an	
unconventional	 view	 from	 the	 side,	
with	ones	right	cheek	along	the	wall,	at	the	right	edge	of	the	painting	(Fig.	1b).	When	
viewed	 from	 that	 unorthodox	 stance,	 that	 encrypted	 floating	 shape	 takes	 on	 the	
appearance	of	a	precisely	rendered	human	skull	(Fig.	1c).	
Holbein’s	 The	 Ambassadors	 is	 perhaps	 the	most	 admired	 of	 historic	 anamorphoses.	
While	there	is	no	shortage	of	others,	mostly	they	consist	of	 less	remarkable	artifacts,	
including	 encoded	 political	 sleights,	 hidden	 erotica,	 or	 optical	 puzzles	 for	 children.	





newspaper	puzzle	 from	 the	 turn-of-the-century,	which,	 viewed	 from	 the	edge	of	 the	
page,	can	easily	be	seen	to	read	«A	HAPPY	BIRTHDAY»	(Fig.	1d).	Artists	and	architects	
have	frequently	made	use	of	anamorphosis,	as	have	stage	set	designers,	special	effects	
filmmakers,	 and	 hybrid	 artist-scientists	 who	 create	 wildlife	 displays	 (called	 habitat	










did	 the	 same,	 as	 did	 (somewhat	 later)	 the	 American	 Army.	 The	 soldiers	 attached	 to	
these	 units,	 called	 camoufleurs,	 had	 typically	 worked	 before	 the	 war	 as	 architects,	
painters,	 sculptors,	 muralists,	 graphic	 designers,	 and	 theatre	 set	 designers.	 Also	
included	were	 scientists	 who	were	 expert	 in	 optics,	 lighting	 and	 color,	 while	 others	
were	zoologists	(or	naturalists),	since	it	was	widely	believed	at	the	time	that	wartime	
camoufleurs	 could	 undoubtedly	 benefit	 from	 an	 understanding	 of	 protective	
coloration	in	nature.	
A	 wide	 range	 of	 methods	 were	 tested	 in	 the	 development	 of	 field	 camouflage.	
Among	the	most	common	were:	1)	background	matching,	in	which	figures	(personnel,	
vehicles	 or	 equipment)	were	 painted	 or	 otherwise	 covered	 in	 patterns	 that	 enabled	
them	 to	 blend	 in	with	 their	 surroundings;	 2)	disruptive	 patterning,	 in	which	 a	 figure	
was	 visually	 broken	 apart	 by	 covering	 its	 surface	 with	 a	 hodge-podge	 of	 discordant	
shapes	 (not	 unlike	 a	 harlequin’s	 suit	 or	 a	 crazy	 quilt);	 and	 3)	mimicry,	 in	 which	 a	
figure’s	appearance	was	altered,	causing	 it	 to	be	misidentified	as	a	radically	different	
kind	of	thing.	To	be	sure,	there	were	numerous	other	approaches	as	well.	
As	 for	 perspective	 illusions,	 it	 appears	 that	 their	 usefulness	 was	 limited	 in	 field	
camouflage,	partly	for	the	reason	that	Leonardo	had	anticipated.	A	perspective	illusion	
works	 best	 if	 seen	 from	 the	 very	 same	 viewpoint	 from	 which	 it	 was	 made.	 For	
example,	there	is	a	photograph	from	WWI	that	records	an	attempt	by	American	Army	
camoufleurs	 to	 create	 a	 perspective	 illusion	 (using	 a	 painted	 scenic	 background)	 in	





understand	 how	 this	 worked,	 it	 is	
instructive	 to	 look	 at	 three	 other	
images	 from	 the	 same	 time	 period.	
Two	 of	 these	 (Figs.	 2b	 and	 2c)	 are	
WWI-era	 drawings	 by	 American	 artist	
and	 camoufleur	 Joseph	 Minturn,	 in	
which	 he	 shows	 how	 he	 and	 other	
artists	 made	 large-scale	 outdoor	
backdrops	 that	 were	 based	 on	
perspective	 illusions	 (Minturn	 [1921]).	
The	 last	 is	 an	 editorial	 cartoon	 titled	
«Camouflage»	 (Fig.	 2d)	 in	 which	 a	
comparable	 forced	 perspective	 ploy	 is	
used	for	political	commentary.	
The	 problem	 with	 all	 these	
examples	 (which	 Minturn	 does	 not	
fully	 explain)	 is	 that	 they	 are	 only	
convincing	 (if	 at	 all)	 when	 the	
backdrop	 is	 viewed	 frontally,	more	 or	
less.	 From	an	eccentric	 view	 from	the	
side,	 they	 appear	 to	 be	 greatly	
distorted,	 just	as	the	two	ambassadors	 in	Holbein’s	famous	painting	appear	distorted	





submarines	 to	 engage	 in	 deadly	 torpedo	 assaults	 on	 non-military	 vessels,	 rightfully	
suspecting	 that	 supposedly	 blameless	 merchant	 ships	 were	 delivering	 weapons,	
ammunition	and	other	wartime	contraband	to	England.	Among	the	consequences	was	
the	 attack	 on	 the	 British	 ocean	 liner	 RMS	 Lusitania,	 off	 the	 coast	 of	 Ireland,	 in	May	
1915,	in	which	nearly	1200	people	died,	including	128	Americans.	








adoption	 of	 (what	 he	 and	 others	 called)	 dazzle-painting,	 a	 high	 difference	 brand	 of	
camouflage	 in	 which	 a	 ship	 was	 broken	 up	 (visually)	 by	 a	 profusion	 of	 contrasting	




as	 ten	or	 twelve	miles	 away)	 and	
the	 emission	 of	 smoke	 from	 its	
smokestacks	 –	 but	 rather	 to	
decrease	 the	odds	of	 aiming	 at	 it	
accurately	 from	 the	 inevitably	
unreliable	 view	 of	 a	 U-boat	
periscope.	
It	is	important	to	realize	that	a	U-
boat	 did	 not	 aim	 directly	 at	 a	
targeted	 enemy	 ship,	 nor	 did	 it	
“lead	 its	 target”	 in	 the	
straightforward,	 pedestrian	
manner	of	a	duck	hunter.	Instead,	
complex	 calculations	 were	 made	
to	 determine	 where	 the	 ship	
would	 be	 by	 the	 time	 the	
discharged	 torpedo	 arrived.	 This	 was	 achieved	 in	 a	 roundabout	 way	 that	 relied	 on	
informed	 “guesses”	 about	 the	 range	 or	 distance	 of	 the	 ship,	 its	 speed,	 and	 the	
direction	in	which	it	was	headed.	To	do	this	was	far	from	easy	(or	safe),	in	part	because	
a	periscope	could	only	be	raised	above	the	water	 for	about	 thirty	seconds	at	a	 time,	
because	 it	 left	 a	 telltale	 surface	 wake	 that	 announced	 the	 U-boat’s	 location	 to	
submarine	chasers.	
On	 the	 Allies’	 side,	 all	 sorts	 of	 inventive	 methods	 were	 used	 to	 promote	
miscalculations.	 Ships	 were	 sometimes	 made	 to	 look	 as	 if	 they	 were	 traveling	
backwards,	 or	 false	 bow	waves	were	 painted	 on	 to	 throw	 off	 estimations	 of	 speed.	
Confusing	 structural	 changes	 were	 made	 to	 the	 stacks	 and	 masts.	 As	 for	 dazzle-
painting,	 high	 contrast	 disruptive	 schemes	 were	 sometimes	 so	 bewildering	 (as	








To	 further	 guarantee	 its	 success,	 ship	 camouflage	 was	 combined	 with	 other	
methods,	 such	as	 traveling	 in	convoys	with	escorts	of	 submarine	chasers,	or	steering	
not	 straight	 but	 in	 zigzags.	 During	WWI,	 despite	 ongoing	 advances	 in	 periscope	 and	
torpedo	design,	it	was	claimed	that	captured	documents	showed	that	even	the	U-boat	
commanders	 believed	 that	 the	 range,	 course	 and	 speed	 of	 an	 Allied	 ship	 could	 be	
calculated	with	difficulty,	if	at	all.	
In	 1917,	 when	 the	 US	 officially	 entered	 the	 war,	 it	 set	 up	 its	 own	 dedicated	
camouflage	units,	both	land	and	sea.	To	address	the	needs	of	the	navy,	artist	Norman	
Wilkinson	was	“loaned”	by	the	British	Admiralty	to	the	US	for	one	month,	during	which	









battle	 about	 whether	 artists,	 architects	 or	 scientists	 were	 better	 suited	 to	 be	
camouflage	 experts,	 a	 parallel	 science-based	 center	 (headed	 by	 optical	 physiologist	
Loyd	 Jones,	 who	 favored	 low	 visibility	 schemes)	 was	 established	 at	 Eastman	 Kodak	
Laboratories	 in	 Rochester	 NY.	 Harold	 Van	 Buskirk,	 an	 architect	 and	 Olympic	 fencing	




employed.	 Several	 of	 his	 articles	 appeared	 in	 popular	 magazines	 at	 the	 end	 of	 or	
shortly	after	 the	war	 (Warner	 [1919a	and	1919b]).	Others	were	never	published,	but	
have	 survived	 as	 scorched-edge	 typescripts	 after	 (posthumously)	 his	 painting	 studio	
caught	 fire	 in	 1972.	 In	 those	 writings,	 Warner	 recalls	 that,	 as	 Wilkinson’s	 influence	
faded,	 American	 naval	 camoufleurs	 relied	 increasingly	 on	 their	 own	 discoveries.	 In	







deception	which	we	 used	 at	 first,	 and	 perhaps	 in	 the	 larger	 sense	 it	may	 be	 said	 to	
have	governed	all	of	our	patterns»	(Warner,	in	Behrens	[2012]:	202-204).	
To	 explain	 how	 such	 distortions	 work,	Warner	 instructed	 his	 readers	 to	 suppose	
that	the	side	of	a	ship	had	been	
painted	 with	 black	 squares,	 the	 largest	 toward	 the	 stern	 [the	 rear]	 and	 the	 others	
diminishing	 in	 size	 toward	 the	 bow	 [the	 front].	 The	 human	 eye	 is	 so	 accustomed	 to	 the	
normal	operation	of	perspective	that	if	this	vessel	is	viewed	from	some	point	off	the	bow	
we	 unconsciously	 assume	 that	 the	 squares	 are	 of	 similar	 size,	 and	 that,	 following	 the	
natural	law	of	perspective,	the	smallest	one	is	the	farthest	away	from	us.	This	gives	us	the	
idea	 that	 the	bow	 is	 farther	away	 from	us	 than	 the	 stern,	and	 that	 the	vessel	 is	heading	
away,	when	in	reality	it	is	steering	in	our	direction	(Warner,	in	Behrens	[2012]:	204).	
A	journalist	said	it	more	simply:	«Ships	were	made	to	have	the	appearance	of	turning	
when	 they	 were	 actually	 holding	 a	 straight	 course»	 (Sparkes	 [1935]:	 82).	 Or,	
conversely,	 a	 ship	 might	 appear	 to	 be	 steering	 ahead	 when	 in	 fact	 it	 was	 actually	
turning.	 Obviously,	 misperceptions	 of	 this	 kind	 could	 be	 critical	 in	 subverting	 the	
calculations	 of	 the	 ship’s	 future	 position.	 Indeed,	 according	 to	 Wilkinson,	 a	 course	
direction	error	of	as	little	as	eight	degrees	might	enable	a	ship	to	avoid	being	hit,	while	
others	said	fifteen	or	eighteen.	




























surfaces,	 according	 to	 Warner,	 is	 as	
plain	 as	 plane	 geometry.	 But,	 while	
that	 in	 itself	 is	useful,	he	believed	that	
a	greater	achievement	was	made	when	
he	 and	 his	 co-workers	 redefined	 the	
problem	as	a	matter	of	solid	geometry.	
In	 paraphrase,	 this	 is	 how	 that	 came	
about:	 Warner’s	 navy	 camoufleurs	
were	 responsible	 for	 the	 design	 of	 all	
American	 marine	 camouflage,	 both	
military	and	merchant	ships.	However,	
there	were	additional	 teams	of	civilian	
camoufleurs	 (many	 of	 them	 artists)	 at	
about	 a	 dozen	 shipping	 yards	 around	
the	 country	 (New	 York,	 Boston,	
Philadelphia,	 Norfolk,	 Jacksonville	 and	
so	 on)	 whose	 chief	 responsibility	 was	
to	 apply	 those	 camouflage	 schemes	 to	 the	 actual	 ships.	 While	 these	 port-based	




At	 some	 point,	 Warner	 became	 dismayed	 by	 what	 he	 considered	 ineptness	 or	
errors	in	making	these	modifications.	As	a	result,	he	began	to	hold	training	sessions	for	
the	civilian	camoufleurs,	«three	of	whom	came	down	every	week	[to	Washington	DC]	





preparing	 for	 these	 workshops,	 Warner	 sliced	 up	 wooden	 ship	 models	 into	 smaller	
sections	 and	 applied	 contrasting	 patterns	 to	 each.	 One	 day,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 doing	
this,	 he	 arranged	 a	 selection	 of	 pieces	 on	 a	 tabletop,	 and	 placed	 behind	 them	 a	
monochrome	gray	 ship	model	 (Fig	 4a).	 To	 everyone’s	 surprise,	when	 the	model	was	
placed	 at	 any	 angle	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 pieces,	 (in	 Warner’s	 words)	 «it	 invariably	
appeared	to	take	the	same	direction	as	the	blocks»	(Warner,	in	Behrens	[2012]:	208).	






at	 the	 controversial	 Armory	 Show	 in	 1913.	 In	 countless	 wartime	 news	 reports,	
camouflaged	 ships	 were	 jokingly	 called	 «seagoing	 Easter	 eggs»,	 «an	 intoxicated	
snake»,	 «a	 Russian	 toy	 shop	 gone	 mad»,	 «the	 delirium	 tremens»	 and	 so	 on.	 But	
Everett	Warner	and	his	co-workers	were	anything	but	cubists,	and	sadly,	 in	the	years	
that	followed	the	war,	many	of	them	could	no	longer	earn	their	living	as	artists,	since	
their	artwork	was	discredited	as	 insufficiently	«modern».	To	Warner	and	his	 team,	 it	
was	both	 ironic	 and	baffling	«that	 it	was	precisely	when	our	 [camouflage]	work	was	
most	firmly	grounded	on	the	book	of	Euclid	that	the	uninitiated	were	the	most	positive	
that	 the	 ships	were	 being	 painted	 by	 a	 group	 of	 crazy	 cubists»	 (Warner,	 in	 Behrens	
[2012]:	209).	
To	 attempt	 to	 camouflage	 ships	 in	 any	way	 other	 than	 routinely	 coating	 them	 in	
monochrome	 gray	 required	 extensive	 planning,	 substantial	 labor	 and	 great	 expense.	
To	diehard	navy	personnel,	 the	gaudy	 Jezebel	dazzle	designs	were	not	only	hideous,	
they	were	a	blatant	 subversion	of	order	and	 regularity	 in	military	 tradition.	The	high	
visibility	 patterns	 of	 «dazzle-painting»	 (which	 artists	 claimed	 were	 contributive	 to	
camouflage)	 were	 counterintuitive,	 and,	 to	 their	 detractors,	 it	 was	 only	 a	matter	 of	
common	sense	to	see	this	as	the	latest	case	of	the	Emperor’s	Clothes.	
Today	 there	 is	 still	widespread	public	 doubt	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	WWI	 ship	
camouflage.	 As	 is	 often	 asked,	 how	 can	 we	 know	 if	 it	 actually	 worked	 if	 the	 only	
evidence	we	have	is	anecdotal,	non-scientific	speculation?	







models	 was	 given	 (by	 Boston	 District	 camoufleurs)	 to	 the	 Department	 of	 Naval	
Architecture	and	Marine	Engineering	at	the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology.	In	
charge	of	this	equipment	was	Professor	Cecil	H.	Peabody,	who	permitted	it	to	be	used	
for	 quantitative	 research	 of	 ship	 camouflage	 by	 Leo	 S.	 Blodgett,	 an	MIT	 engineering	
student.	 The	 results	 of	 Blodgett’s	 experiments	 were	 published	 in	 May	 1919	 as	 an	
academic	thesis,	a	document	that	is	still	on	file	and	accessible	on	the	internet.	
Blodgett’s	 research	 procedures,	 as	 well	 as	 his	 conclusions,	 are	 too	 complex	 to	
recount	 in	 detail.	 But	 in	 brief,	 he	 proceeded	 as	 follows:	 He	 and	 his	 co-workers	
prepared	 wooden	 ship	 models	 at	 a	 scale	 of	 1/32	 inch	 =	 1	 foot.	 They	 designed	 and	
applied	camouflage	schemes	(using	the	same	colors	that	had	been	adopted	by	the	US	
Navy),	 all	 of	 which	were	 «based	 upon	 principles	 of	 distorted	 perspective»	 (Blodgett	
[1919]:	12).	Each	ship	model	was	then	viewed	in	the	setting	of	the	observation	theatre	
(two	photographs	are	 reproduced	 in	Blodgett	 [1919]:	 5),	 a	 contrivance	 that	 included	
«all	 essential	 features	 of	 sea	 and	 sky	 illusion,	 light	 effects,	 and	 periscopic	means	 of	
observation	 comparable	 with	 actual	 conditions»	 (Blodgett	 [1919]:	 3).	 While	 being	
observed,	 each	 model	 was	 placed	 on	 an	 adjustable	 turntable,	 which	 included	 a	
compass	 device	 on	 which	 its	 actual	 angle	 was	 shown.	 At	 the	 opposite	 end	 of	 the	
theatre,	from	which	position	the	ship	was	viewed	through	the	periscope,	was	a	second	
dial,	where	 the	observer	 recorded	an	estimate	of	 the	direction	of	 the	 ship.	 The	goal	
was	to	determine	–	by	numerical	measurement	only	–	the	degree	of	error	that	might	








17).	 The	 second	 observer	 «had	 been	 very	 closely	 in	 touch	 with	 the	 evolution	 and	
application	of	each	design»,	had	«made	repeated	observations	of	 them,	 [and]	 in	 fact	
[had]	offered	valuable	suggestions	in	the	progress	of	the	work»	(Blodgett	[1919]:	18).	
Finally,	 the	 third	 set	 of	 observers	 consisted	 of	 four	 different	 people,	 none	 of	whom	
were	 familiar	 with	 the	 painted	 models,	 «so	 that	 all	 were	 unbiased	 by	 a	 previous	





«entirely	 familiar	 with	 ship	 structures,	 with	 principles	 of	 perspective	 and	 optical	
illusions,	as	well	as	conditions	of	light	and	shadow	at	sea»	(Blodgett	[1919]:	18).	
What	 is	 astonishing	 in	 this	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Blodgett’s	 choice	 of	 observers	
appears	 to	 have	 increased	 the	 challenge	 of	 deceiving	 them.	 They	 were	 not	 only	
“experts”	in	various	ways,	but	in	the	case	of	the	first	and	second	observers,	they	were	
also	 acquainted	 with	 what	 was	 being	 tested	 for.	 Yet,	 even	 under	 those	 conditions,	





place	 almost	 one	 hundred	 years	 ago,	 and	 given	 the	 growth	 of	 technologies	 in	
surveillance,	targeting	and	attack,	we	cannot	assume	it	is	valid	today.	





from	Wikimedia.	 The	 original	 painting	 is	 in	 the	 collection	 of	 the	 National	 Gallery,	
London.		
Figure	 1(b):	 Diagram	 showing	 the	 viewing	 position	 on	 the	 right	 side	 of	 the	 painting	
(where	two	diagonals	intersect),	from	which	position	the	skull	is	no	longer	distorted.		
Figure	 1(c):	 Corrected	 skull	 as	 seen	 from	 that	 position.	 Public	 domain	 image	 from	
Wikimedia.		
Figure	1(d):	Anon,	 typographic	puzzle	 (c1900)	which,	 from	oblique	viewpoints	on	 the	
sides,	reads	A	HAPPY	BIRTHDAY.	Public	domain.	
Figure	 2(a):	 Anon,	World	War	 I	 US	Army	 photograph	 (c1918)	 of	 a	 perspective-based	











Figure	 3(a):	 US	 Navy	 photograph	 of	 perspective	 distortion	 applied	 to	 the	 USS	West	
Shore	 (1918).	 Courtesy	 Naval	 History	 and	 Heritage	 Command	 (NH	 99395).	 Public	
domain.		
Figure	 3(b):	 Illusory	 geometric	 scheme	 applied	 to	 the	 USS	 Congaree	 (c1918),	 as	
reproduced	in	Warner	[1919a].	Public	domain.	
Figure	4(a):	Everett	L.	Warner	(n.d.),	pencil	sketch	of	his	method	of	slicing	up	wooden	
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